The implications of local currency pricing (LCP) for monetary regime choice are analysed for a country facing foreign monetary shocks. In this analysis expenditure switching is potentially welfare reducing. This contrasts with the existing LCP literature, which focuses on productivity shocks and thus analyses a world where expenditure switching is welfare enhancing. This paper shows that, when home and foreign producers follow LCP, expenditure switching is absent and a ‡oating rate is preferred by the home country. But when only home producers follow LCP, expenditure switching is present and a …xed rate can be welfare enhancing for the home country.
Introduction
Extensive empirical evidence suggests that producers engaged in international trade often set prices in the currency of buyers, i.e. they engage in local currency pricing (LCP) .
1 This has prompted a lively literature examining optimal exchange rate and monetary policy in the context of LCP. This literature has, almost without exception, focused on models where the underlying source of uncertainty is shocks to productivity (or labour supply).
This implies that exchange rate movements have a potentially bene…cial role in directing consumer demand towards the country experiencing a positive productivity shock and away from the country experiencing low productivity. The expenditure switching role of exchange rates is therefore potentially welfare enhancing. The main point of debate in this literature is whether LCP, by breaking the short-term link between the nominal exchange rate and the prices faced by buyers, undermines the expenditure switching role of exchange rate movements and thus removes one of the bene…ts of exchange rate ‡exibility. Devereux and Engel (2003) in particular argue that, in the LCP case (where the exchange rate has no expenditure switching role), a …xed exchange rate is bene…cial because it enhances consumption risk sharing. 2 An alternative view of the exchange rate policy problem is that monetary or …nancial market shocks are an important source of movements in exchange rates. Such exchange rate movements, far from reallocating demand optimally, will in fact be the cause of misallocations of demand. In other words, in this view, the exchange rate is a shock transmitter rather than a shock absorber. The expenditure switching e¤ect in this case is a source 1 See, for instance, Engel (1999) , Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Burstein and Gopinath (2014) for broad discussion of empirical evidence on LCP. Recent important contributions to the empirical literature on LCP are Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) , Goldberg and Campa (2010) , Gopinath et al (2010) and Gopinath et al (2011) . 2 Devereux and Engel (2003) show that in the presence of LCP, exchange rate movements cause changes in the real exchange rate which undermine e¢ cient consumption risk sharing. It is therefore optimal to stabilise the nominal exchange rate. There has been a number of counter-arguments to this point of view. For instance, Obstfeld (2002) shows that LCP in trade in …nal goods does not prevent expenditure switching as long as there is producer currency pricing (PCP) at the intermediate goods level, so a ‡oating exchange rate is still better than a …xed rate. Duarte and Obstfeld (2008) show that even in the presence of LCP, exchange rate ‡exibility is necessary for optimal risk sharing even when there are non-traded consumption goods. In a more general model, Devereux and Engel (2007) show that optimal exchange rate ‡exibility depends on the trade-o¤ between expenditure switching and risk sharing. Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) , Engel (2011) and Sutherland (2005) present further analyses of optimal monetary policy in LCP models. Engel (2009) and Sutherland (2005) show that exchange rate variability is a potentially important factor in optimal monetary policy in certain circumstances. See Corsetti et al (2010) and Engel (2014) for recent surveys of the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy in open economies.
of sub-optimal volatility in output and consumption. The idea that exchange rates are often substantially misaligned relative to real fundamentals is indeed a staple of the policy debate. The wide ‡uctuations in the value of the major currencies in the post Bretton
Woods period have given rise to frequent calls for intervention to stabilise exchange rates.
It is clear that there is a widespread view that ‡uctuations in nominal exchange rates of the magnitude of +/-50% in the space of a few years (as has been the case for the US dollar) are unlikely to be driven exclusively by optimal responses to relative productivity movements.
Clearly, by a¤ecting the link between the nominal exchange rate and relative prices, LCP may have important implications for the way in which monetary and …nancial market shocks generate expenditure switching. This in turn may have a signi…cant impact on the welfare performance of alternative exchange rate and monetary policy regimes. By focusing on productivity shocks, the current literature on LCP has largely overlooked this connection between monetary shocks, LCP and exchange rate regime choice. In this paper we aim to address this potentially important shortcoming of the current literature. We analyse the implications of LCP for monetary policy in an economy which faces exchange rate volatility arising from monetary shocks in a foreign country. The analysis focuses on optimal monetary policy for the home country in the face of these foreign monetary shocks. In our analysis, expenditure switching is potentially welfare reducing. This is in direct contrast to the Devereux and Engel (2003) analysis, which analyses the impact of LCP on regime choice in a world where expenditure switching may be welfare enhancing.
We analyse four possible combinations of producer currency pricing (or PCP, where producers set prices in their own currency) and LCP in a two-country model. There are two symmetric cases. One with both home and foreign producers following PCP (Case 1, in our analysis below). And one with both home and foreign producers following LCP (Case 2). There are also two asymmetric cases. One with home producers following PCP and foreign producers following LCP (Case 3). And one with home producers following LCP and foreign producers following PCP (Case 4).
In Case 1, where producers in both countries follow PCP, we show that the exchange rate volatility caused by foreign monetary shocks causes sub-optimal volatility in homecountry output. 3 This creates an incentive for the home country to dampen movements in the exchange rate. However, in Case 2, where there is complete and symmetric LCP, we …nd that the expenditure switching e¤ect is absent. This implies that exchange rate movements play no part in transmitting foreign monetary shocks to the home country. The incentive to stabilise the exchange rate is correspondingly reduced. In this case, ‡oating rate regimes are shown to be welfare superior to a …xed exchange rate. Notice that the presence of LCP in this case has an e¤ect which is exactly opposite to that in the Devereux and Engel (2003) analysis, where LCP creates an incentive for exchange rate stabilisation.
These results are based on a case where producers in both countries follow local currency pricing. 4 The conclusions are somewhat di¤erent, however, if LCP is asymmetric. In Case 3, where home country producers adopt PCP while foreign producers adopt LCP, we …nd that the case for exchange rate ‡exibility is strengthened relative to the symmetric PCP case. But in the opposite case (Case 4), where home producers follow LCP and foreign producers follow PCP, the case for exchange rate stabilisation is strengthened. In fact, in this second asymmetric case, it is shown that a …xed rate can out-perform ‡oating rate regimes in welfare terms.
It is shown therefore that LCP, when it arises in the particular asymmetric way represented by Case 4, can strengthen the argument for a …xed exchange rate. But the underlying reasons di¤er from those emphasised by Devereux and Engel (2003) . It is the continued presence of expenditure switching in our Case 4 which is important, while in Devereux and Engel (2003) it is the absence of expenditure switching which creates the argument for exchange rate stabilisation.
The two asymmetric cases are particularly interesting because, for many countries, it is natural for both exports and imports to be priced in a reference currency, such as the US dollar. For instance, Tavlas (1997) , Bekx (1998) , Tille (2008), Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) , Goldberg and Campa (2010) and Gopinath et al (2010) provide extensive evidence on the use of the US dollar as the currency most used for price setting in international trade. Case 4 corresponds to a world where the foreign currency is a reference currency (e.g. the US dollar). So the policy problem analysed can be interpreted as the choice faced by countries (other than the USA) in a world where trade is priced in US dollars and where US monetary shocks cause ‡uctuations in the value of the dollar. The conclusion is that such countries can bene…t by stabilising (or even …xing) the value of their home currency against the dollar. This indeed corresponds to the monetary policy actually adopted by a wide range of emerging market countries. The …rst asymmetric case (Case 3) corresponds to a world where the home currency is a reference currency, while monetary shocks are occurring in a non-reference currency. The unsurprising conclusion, in this case, is that exchange rate ‡exibility is a useful way for the home country to insulate 4 Our result for the symmetric LCP case closely resembles one of the cases considered by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000) . Unlike much of the literature on monetary policy and LCP, Bacchetta and van Wincoop consider monetary shocks and in a potentially asymmetric policy analysis. They show that an asymmetric peg is inferior to a ‡oating exchange rate. But, unlike this paper, they do not analyse asymmetric LCP.
itself from foreign monetary shocks.
5 analyse optimal monetary policy in a world with a reference currency (i.e. a world with asymmetric LCP/PCP). They …nd that the reference currency country is indi¤erent to exchange rate volatility while non-reference currency countries place a high weight on exchange rate volatility in welfare. They focus on a Nash equilibrium in monetary policy setting and show that the reference currency country su¤ers a welfare loss from the reference status of its currency. Goldberg and Tille (2009) also analyse monetary policy in a world with a reference currency. As with much of the other literature on LCP, and in contrast to the analysis presented in this paper, these authors focus on optimal monetary policy in the face of productivity shocks.
The model we use is very standard. The main di¤erence compared to others is the focus on monetary shocks. In itself, as a general proposition, it is not surprising that policy prescriptions change when the source of shocks changes. This is a well-known theoretical result. Our contribution is to analyse in detail how this works out in a standard model which has been widely used in the current literature. The simplicity of the model allows us to identify the speci…c transmission mechanisms of monetary shocks and show and describe intuitively how optimal policy depends on these mechanisms and the currency of price setting.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the details of the model, Section 3 describes and discusses the links between monetary policy and welfare, Section 4 presents the main discussion of alternative monetary policy regimes in the four cases outlined above, and Section 5 concludes.
5 A further interesting question is prompted by our analysis. If …rms could freely choose the currency in which to price goods, would the equilibrium display LCP in the home country and PCP in the foreign county, or vice versa? Gopinath et al (2010) provide evidence that endogenous choice of pricing currency is indeed a feature of the data. Our paper does not consider endogenous choice of invoicing currency, but Devereux, Engel and Storgaard (2004) o¤er some useful indicators of the likely e¤ect. They show that the currency with the lowest variance of monetary shocks is likely to be chosen as the reference currency. In other words, in the model of the current paper, the home currency will be chosen as the reference currency.
And thus exchange rate ‡exibility will be bene…cial to the home country. However, there are other factors, not modelled by Devereux, Engel and Storgaard, which a¤ect the choice of reference currency. The US dollar is clearly a major reference currency because of the size of the US economy and the liquidity and e¢ ciency of US monetary and …nancial markets, and not because of the low variance of monetary shocks in the USA. The size and liquidity of the US monetary sector is thus likely to outweigh other factors in the choice of reference currency for small emerging market countries. Therefore, the case where home producers follow LCP and foreign producers follow PCP (our Case 4), with monetary shocks occurring in the foreign country, is likely to be relevant for many emerging market economies, despite the Devereux, Engel and Storgaard (2004) prediction.
The Model
We use a variant of the benchmark sticky-price general equilibrium model that follows the framework developed by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995, 2002 and foreign produced goods. Each agent is a monopoly producer of a single di¤erentiated product. All agents set prices before shocks occur and are contracted to meet demand at these pre-set prices. We consider both producer currency pricing (PCP) and local currency pricing (LCP).
The detailed structure of the home country is described below. The foreign country has an identical structure. Where appropriate, foreign real variables and foreign currency prices are indicated with an asterisk.
Preferences
The utility of representative home agent h is
where and K are positive constants, C is a consumption index de…ned across all home and foreign goods, M denotes end-of-period nominal money holdings, P is the consumer price index, y H (h) is the output of good h for sale in the home country and y H (h) is the output of good h for sale in the foreign country and E is the expectations operator. The consumption index C for home agents is
where C H and C F are Dixit-Stiglitz indices of home and foreign produced goods with elasticity between individual goods denoted ; where > 1. The parameter is the 6 Utility is assumed to be additively separable in y H (h) and y H (h). This greatly simpli…es the algebra and provides a very simple and intuitive set of results. An alternative model, with non-additively separable utility in y H (h) and y H (h) ; delivers qualitatively the same conclusions but at the cost of greater complexity.
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. In many papers in the related literature, this parameter is assumed to be unity. It will become apparent below that plays an key role in determining the strength of the expenditure switching e¤ect and thus has important implications for the welfare ranking of monetary policy regimes.
The budget constraint of agent h is
where M 0 and M (h) are initial and …nal money holdings, T is a lump-sum government transfer, p H (h) is the price of home good h for sale in the home market, p H (h) is the foreign currency price of home good h for sale in the foreign market, S is the nominal exchange rate (expressed as the home currency price of foreign currency) and R(h) is the income from a portfolio of state contingent assets (to be described in more detail below in sub-section 2.3).
The government's budget constraint is: M M 0 + T = 0: Changes in the money supply are assumed to enter and leave the economy via changes in lump-sum transfers.
The aggregate consumer price index for home agents is
where P H and P F are the price indices for home and foreign goods respectively.
Given the utility function and budget constraint just described, optimal home demands for home and foreign goods are
The demand for home and foreign goods by foreign agents has an identical structure to the home demands. The total population of each country is normalised to unity. The total demands for goods are therefore equivalent to individual demands.
The aggregate output of home goods for sale in the home and foreign countries are respectively Y H and Y H and the corresponding outputs for the foreign country are Y F and
and C F are foreign country demands for home and foreign goods.
Price Setting
Agents set the prices of their output in advance of the realisation of shocks. The …rst-order conditions for price setting di¤er depending on whether producers engage in PCP or LCP.
We assume home and foreign goods markets are segmented (in the sense that separate prices can be set in home and foreign markets for all goods) in both PCP and LCP cases. Notice that the law of one price, When home producers follow PCP (i.e. set prices in their own currency), the …rst-order condition for price setting imply
where P H is the price of home goods for sale to home agents and P H is the price of home goods for sale to foreign agents (expressed in foreign currency). These expressions indicate that a form of risk premium arises in goods prices because agents face uncertainty over the level of work e¤ort.
When home producers engage in LCP the …rst-order conditions for home and foreign prices are as follows
Note that the only di¤erence between (7) and (6) is the way the exchange rate enters in the expression for P H : In the PCP case, producers set the price of the home good in the foreign market in terms of home currency. The nominal exchange rate a¤ects the foreign currency price, P H ; after the monetary shock is realised, so prices exhibit full exchange rate passthrough. In the LCP case home producers set the price of the home good in the foreign market in foreign currency before the monetary shock is realised and the exchange rate is determined. It is thus only expectations of the exchange rate which enter the expression for P H in (7). The actual realisation of the exchange rate has no impact on P H ; so there is no exchange rate pass-through.
Similar expressions can be derived for the prices of foreign goods, P F and P F in the PCP and LCP cases.
One of the monetary policy rules considered below is a regime which targets a measure of producer prices for the home economy. We de…ne this producer price measure to be the price of home goods for sale in the home country, P H : Because, in this model, all goods prices are pre-set (and thus do not vary in response to shocks), the 'price-targeting' regime is modelled in terms of the price level that producers would choose in a ‡exible price environment. This price level, denoted P V H (where the superscript 'V 'indicates that this is a 'virtual'or 'notional'price level) is given by the expression for P H in (6) (or (7)) after removing the expectations operators from the right hand side, i.e.
and thus purchasing power parity, does not hold even in the PCP case. Assuming non-segmented markets in the PCP case (so that the law of one price does hold in that case) makes no signi…cant di¤erence to the results reported below.
Price targeting is de…ned in terms of a target level for P V H : 8
Financial Markets and Risk Sharing
When, as in the current model, shocks are asymmetric and the focus of interest is the policy choice and welfare of a single country, it is necessary explicitly to consider how policy choices a¤ect asset prices and portfolio decisions. We assume that …nancial markets are su¢ ciently sophisticated to allow full sharing of consumption risks. This is achieved by assuming that trade takes place in equity shares in each country's real income. Thus a unit of the "home equity"pays a return proportional to y where
and a unit of the "foreign equity"pays a return proportional to y where
The portfolio returns for home and foreign agents are thus
where H (h) and F (h) are holdings of home agent h of the home and foreign equities, H (f ) and F (f ) are the holdings of foreign agent f of home and foreign equities, q H and q F are the unit prices of the home and foreign equities and Q = P S=P is the real exchange rate.
It is important to note that (following Devereux and Engel, 2003) , the payo¤s from assets are assumed to be transferred between countries in terms of money. Transfers in terms of goods are ruled out. This implies that the equilibrium in asset markets does not ensure fully e¢ cient risk sharing in the case of LCP. This is because households in the two countries value the portfolio payo¤s in terms of the goods prices they face in their respective countries. In the LCP case, the law of one price does not hold so there will be distortions in relative valuations of the portfolio payo¤ across the two countries.
Asset trade is assumed to take place after the choice of policy regime. Agents can therefore insure themselves against the risk implied by a particular policy regime, but they can not insure themselves against the choice of regime itself. Asset market equilibrium implies the following relationship between consumption, asset prices and expected output levels in the two countries
The derivation of this expression is outlined in the Appendix. Notice that the real exchange rate, Q, enters this expression. Fluctuations in Q in the LCP case re ‡ect ine¢ cient deviations from the law of one price. These cause deviations from e¢ cient consumption risk sharing.
Money Demand and Supply
Optimal choice of money holdings implies
The monetary authorities in each country set monetary policy in terms of the relevant national money supply. The money supply in the foreign country is assumed to be stochastic such that log M is symmetrically distributed over the interval
and V ar[log M ] = 2 . These shocks may represent monetary policy errors on the part of the foreign monetary authority, or they may be interpreted as disturbances to foreign money demand, or as …nancial innovation shocks, which are not fully accommodated by money supply changes. The presence of such shocks clearly implies that the foreign central bank is not following an optimal monetary policy. Thus, the …rst-best policy, in terms of world aggregate welfare, would be a policy rule for the foreign central bank which entirely eliminates the monetary disturbances. However, the objective of the present paper is to analyse the home country monetary policy response when the global …rst-best policy rule is not being implemented by the foreign central bank. Thus, for the purposes of this exercise, the policy of the foreign central bank is taken to be a …xed and exogenous feature of the world economy.
We de…ne home monetary policy in terms of a feedback rule of the following form
The value of the policy feedback parameter, ; di¤ers depending on the monetary regime under consideration. Four di¤erent regimes are considered: a …xed nominal exchange rate; money targeting; price targeting; and a welfare maximising monetary rule. In the …xed exchange rate regime, is chosen so that the exchange rate is maintained at a target level, S.
In the money targeting regime, is set to zero so that the home money supply is constant at M . In the price targeting regime, is determined so that the virtual (or 'notional') producer-price level, P V H , is maintained at a target level, P V H . And …nally, optimal policy is de…ned to be the choice of which maximises home aggregate utility. The values of implied by each regime are stated below. 10 
Welfare
Aggregate welfare of home agents is measured using the following
It is not possible to derive an exact solution to the model described above. A secondorder approximation of the welfare expression is therefore derived. A summary of all the equations of the model (in both exact and approximated form) is provided in the Appendix.
The Appendix also explains how a second-order accurate solution is obtained.
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A second-order approximation of the welfare measure is given bỹ
where~ is the deviation of the level of welfare from the non-stochastic equilibrium. Henceforth, a hat over a variable indicates a log deviation from the non-stochastic steady state and a bar indicates the value in the non-stochastic steady state. Notice that welfare expression (15) includes the …rst moments of consumption and output and the second moments of output components. Welfare is increasing in the expected level of consumption and decreasing in the expected level and variance of the components of output. Second-order accurate solutions for variances can be obtained from …rst-order accurate solutions for the relationships between endogenous variables and the shock variable. The analysis of volatility therefore involves working with a log-linearised (i.e. …rst-order approximated) version of the model. But a full second-order expression for welfare requires second-order accurate 10 The target values of M ; S and P V H have no role other than to provide an anchor for nominal variables. The equilibrium level of nominal variables is irrelevant for aggregate utility and therefore has no implications for the analysis presented below. 11 The utility of real balances is assumed to be small enough to be neglected. 12 The approximation is taken around the non-stochastic equilibrium of the model, which is de…ned as the solution which results when M = 1 with 2 = 0. Note that, the only exogenous forcing variable in the model is the foreign money supply, M , so all log-deviations from the non-stochastic equilibrium are of the same order as the shocks, which (by assumption) are of maximum size . When presenting an equation which is approximated up to order n it is therefore possible to gather all terms of order higher than n in a single term denoted O n+1 .
solutions for both the …rst and second moments of variables. So, a full analysis of welfare involves working with a second-order approximation of the model.
In the non-stochastic equilibrium, Y H and Y H depend on the monopoly mark-up, =( 1). A common practice in the related literature is to introduce a production subsidy to ensure that outputs are at their welfare maximising level. In all the cases which we will examine below it can be shown that
The welfare results in this paper are thus independent of the value of Y H and Y H and are therefore independent of the monopoly distortion and any production subsidy. This also implies that welfare is e¤ectively determined by E[Ĉ] alone, i.e.~ = E[Ĉ]. This has the useful implication that welfare, as measured by~ ; can be interpreted directly in terms of logchanges of consumption relative to its steady state level. Thus, in quantitative terms, 100 ~ can be interpreted as directly equivalent to a percentage of steady state consumption.
Welfare and Output Volatility
Before analysing the individual monetary policy rules it is useful to trace and explain the main linkages between monetary policy and welfare. This will provide a framework to understand and explain the results presented in the next section. The Appendix shows that welfare, as de…ned in equation (15), can be re-written in a particularly simple and intuitive form. In Cases 1 and 4, where foreign producers are following PCP and the home producers are following either PCP (Case 1) or LCP (Case 4), welfare can be expressed as
while in Cases 2 and 3, where the foreign producers are following LCP and the home producers are following either LCP (Case 2) or PCP (Case 3), welfare can be expressed in the form
Thus welfare can be written as a linear function of the variances of the components of output in each country, and in the case of equation (16) the variance of the exchange rate.
So, monetary policy a¤ects welfare via its e¤ect on these individual variances.
The impact of monetary policy on the variances ofŶ H ,Ŷ F ,Ŷ H ,Ŷ F andŜ will be described in more detail below, but …rst it is useful to understand why these variances a¤ect welfare in the way shown in (16) and (17). As mentioned above, because
H ] = 0; welfare depends directly (and only) on the expected level of consumption, E[Ĉ], so to explain (16) and (17) it is necessary …rst to understand how the
The link between output variances and expected consumption operates via the impact of output variances on the optimal goods prices set by …rms. This is shown most clearly in the …rst order conditions for price setting, equations (6) and (7). These equations show that an important determinant of the optimal price of a good is the variance of the output of that good. This re ‡ects risk aversion on the part of producers. A higher output variance implies a higher optimal price. And, by de…nition, a higher optimal price implies a lower expected level of demand and thus a lower expected level of output of that good in equilibrium. There is thus a direct negative relationship between the variances of the output of each good and the expected level of output of that good, i.e. E[Ŷ The …rst e¤ect is an aggregate resource e¤ect. An increase in the output of any type of good increases the aggregate resources available for consumption in the world. The second e¤ect is a terms of trade e¤ect. An increase in the output of goods produced in the home country (for either home or foreign consumption) depresses the home terms of trade. The strength of this e¤ect depends on ; the international trade elasticity. If is greater than unity, an increase in the output of home goods has a relatively small impact on the terms of trade, so the relative income of the home country increases. This allows the home country to expand consumption at the expense of the foreign country. The third e¤ect is a real exchange rate e¤ect. An increase in the output of goods consumed by the home country reduces the relative price of the home consumption basket and thus again allows the home country to increase consumption at the expense of the foreign country.
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In the case of goods produced in the home country and consumed in the home country, all three of these e¤ects work in the same direction (at least when > 1). So a reduction in the variance ofŶ H raises E[Ŷ H ] and raises E[Ĉ]; hence the negative coe¢ cient on E[Ŷ 2 H ] in (16) and (17). In the case of goods produced in home country and consumed in the foreign 13 Note that price discrimination between home and foreign markets implies that purchasing power parity does not hold, even when producers follow PCP. This implies that the real exchange rate e¤ ect is present in all permutations of LCP and PCP. country, the terms of trade and real exchange rate e¤ects work in opposite directions (when > 1). raises the cost of the foreign consumption basket and therefore allows home consumption to increase relative to foreign consumption. 14 This completes the explanation of the link between output variances and welfare. Equation (16), however, shows that, when foreign producers follow PCP, the variance of the exchange rate also enters the welfare expression. This e¤ect arises from a combination of a number of small and o¤setting e¤ects which have no clear economic interpretation. This e¤ect is positive when > 1. Thus exchange rate volatility appears to have a positive e¤ect on welfare for > 1. But note that exchange rate volatility has an additional indirect e¤ect on welfare via its impact on the variances ofŶ H ,Ŷ F ,Ŷ H andŶ F : It is these indirect e¤ects that dominate the relative performance of the di¤erent policy regimes analysed below.
Monetary Policy and Output Volatility
The previous sub-section explained welfare in terms of the volatility ofŶ H ,Ŷ F ,Ŷ H ,Ŷ F andŜ: This explains one part of the link between monetary policy and welfare. It is now necessary to explain the second part of the link, i.e. the link between home monetary policy and the volatility ofŶ H ,Ŷ F ,Ŷ H ,Ŷ F andŜ: When considering the impact of monetary policy on volatility it is su¢ cient to look at …rst-order accurate solutions to the model.
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A …rst-order expansion of equation (11) shows that risk sharing implies the following relationship between realised consumption levels in the two countries:Ĉ Ĉ =Ŝ +P P + O ( 2 ). When combined with the expressions for home and foreign money demand (which implyM =P +Ĉ andM =P +Ĉ ), the following expression for the exchange 14 Clearly, the sign of the terms of trade e¤ect depends on the value of : When < 1 an increase in the volume of output can lead to a fall in the value of home income. This reverses the sign of the coe¢ cients on E[Ŷ Using (5) and the corresponding expressions for the foreign country, …rst-order approximations for home and foreign aggregate output levels can be written as followŝ
These equations show that output levels depend on aggregate consumption in the relevant country and a relative price term. Making use of …rst-order approximations ofP andP (i.e. (4) and its foreign counterpart) and the expressions for money demand (i.e. (12) and its foreign counterpart) it is possible to rewrite (19) and (20) as followŝ
Furthermore, it follows from the …rst-order conditions for price setting thatP H = 0 and
Expressions (23) and (24) show that output levels depend on the money supply and Table 1. The table shows the expressions for output levels (after substituting for the exchange rate usingŜ =M M )
for the four permutations of PCP and LCP across the two countries.
The expressions in Table 1 show that monetary policy has potentially two e¤ects on output levels, one via the impact of home money on the world aggregate money supply, 
Case 2 (Home LCP, Foreign LCP)
Case 4 (Home LCP, Foreign PCP)
, and one via the impact of home money on relative money supplies, (M M ).
The …rst e¤ect arises because, for given price levels, monetary policy a¤ects home and foreign aggregate consumption, C and C , directly via money market equilibrium. The second e¤ect arises because monetary policy a¤ects relative goods prices via the nominal exchange rate, S (as shown in (18)). But the magnitude of this second e¤ect depends on the degree of exchange rate pass-through, and thus di¤ers in the PCP and LCP cases.
The relative price e¤ect also depends on the international trade elasticity, . The relative importance of (M +M ) and (M M ) inŶ H ,Ŷ F ,Ŷ H andŶ F thus depends jointly on the value of and the form of price setting. The larger the value of (i.e. the stronger the expenditure switching e¤ect) the more important is volatility in S and thus the more important is (M M ): But this e¤ect only arises in the PCP case. In the LCP case, there is no pass-through from exchange rate changes to prices.
Given exogenous shocks to M , a policy which stabilises (M +M ) will necessarily destabilise (M M ) and vice versa. The home monetary authority therefore faces a trade-o¤ between stabilising (M +M ) and (M M ): The terms of this trade-o¤ will depend on the form of price setting, PCP versus LCP, and on the value of : The balance between these di¤erent e¤ects clearly has important implications for the relative welfare performance of the di¤erent policy regimes. This will become clear as the results are described for the four di¤erent permutations of LCP and PCP in Cases 1 to 4.
Results
The results are now presented for the four cases outlined in the introduction. In Case 1 both home and foreign producers follow PCP. 16 In Case 2 both home and foreign producers follow LCP. Cases 3 and 4 are asymmetric. In Case 3 home producers follow PCP and foreign producers follow LCP. And in Case 4 home producers follow LCP and foreign producers follow PCP. Table 2 and Figures 1, 2 and 3 correspond to the results presented in our previous analysis (Senay and Sutherland, 2007a) .
Case 1: Home and Foreign Producers Follow PCP
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First consider a comparison between money targeting and a …xed nominal exchange 16 A detailed analysis of Case 1 is presented in Senay and Sutherland (2007a) . 17 For the purpose of illustration these …gures, and all subsequent …gures, are based on = 0:1: The vertical axis in Figure 2 plots welfare in terms of 100 ~ : This quantity can be interpreted as a percentage of steady state consumption. Subsequent welfare plots can also be interpreted in these terms. 18 There are minor di¤erences compared to Senay and Sutherland (2007a) Table 2 shows that price targeting implies a value of between zero and unity. Thus price targeting can be regarded as a compromise between monetary targeting and a …xed rate. Figure 2 shows that price targeting delivers higher welfare than both a …xed rate and money targeting for all values of . This higher welfare performance arises because price targeting o¤ers a compromise between stabilising (M +M ) and stabilising (M M ). Price targeting is thus more successful at stabilising home output than either a …xed rate or money targeting. Notice that, as rises, so that exchange rate volatility becomes more important in determining output volatility, price targeting tends to imply more exchange rate stabilisation.
While price targeting is a good compromise between a …xed rate and money targeting, Table 2 shows that price targeting is not equivalent to the fully optimal policy. The fully optimal policy rule is given by choosing the value of to maximise home welfare. The implied optimal value of is shown in Table 2 . For > 1 it is clear that this value of is again between zero and unity, so optimal policy is a compromise between a …xed rate and money targeting. Figure 3 shows that price targeting is a reasonably good approximation for optimal policy, but optimal policy (for > 1) implies slightly more exchange rate stabilisation than price targeting.
19
19 Notice that when < 1 optimal policy implies higher exchange rate volatility than the other regimes.
As previously explained, when < 1; an increase in home output reduces home income. This reverses the welfare impact of exchange rate volatility. When < 1; higher exchange rate volatility reduces home output and increases home income.
A useful point of comparison in the existing literature is the analysis of Benigno and Benigno (2003) who show that price targeting is the optimal coordinated and Nash equilibrium policy in a two-country model with PCP and shocks to productivity. Benigno and Benigno (2003) assume a unit elasticity between home and foreign goods ( = 1), but the optimality of price targeting in a coordinated equilibrium continues to hold in their framework for di¤erent from unity. This contrasts with our …nding that price targeting is not fully optimal in the face of foreign monetary shocks when di¤ers from unity.
Case 2: Home and Foreign Producers Follow LCP
Now consider Case 2, where both home and foreign producers follow LCP. Table 3 presents a comparison between the four monetary regimes for Case 2.
It is immediately clear that monetary targeting, price targeting and optimal policy are all identical in this case. They all imply = 0 and they all deliver higher welfare than a …xed nominal exchange rate. The explanation for this ranking of regimes is simple to understand in terms of the output equations in Table 1 A …xed rate regime, however, is clearly sub-optimal because it requires home monetary policy to match the foreign money shocks. This causes unnecessary, and welfare reducing, volatility inŶ H andŶ F .
The underlying reason for the contrast with Case 1 is the complete absence of the expenditure switching e¤ect of exchange rate changes when both home and foreign producers follow LCP. Symmetric LCP implies that exchange rate changes have no impact on the relative prices faced by consumers in the short run. Nominal exchange rate volatility is therefore irrelevant for output determination and welfare. The incentive to stabilise the exchange rate is correspondingly reduced. An obvious corollary of this is that the international trade elasticity, ; is irrelevant to the welfare comparison between policy regimes.
Notice that the presence of LCP in this model has an e¤ect which is exactly opposite to that in the Devereux and Engel (2003) analysis, where LCP creates an incentive for exchange rate stabilisation. In the Devereux and Engel (2003) model the impact of exchange rate volatility on consumption risk sharing is strong enough on its own to make a …xed rate 
optimal. This e¤ect does not arise in the model analysed here because a …xed exchange rate transfers consumption risk from the foreign country to the home country. This may be welfare improving for the foreign country and even may be welfare improving for the world as a whole (measured in terms of the aggregate of home and foreign utility) but it is not welfare improving for the home country.
Case 3: Home Producers Follow PCP, Foreign Producers
Follow LCP Table 4 and Figures 4, 5 and 6 present a comparison between the four monetary policy regimes in Case 3, where home producers follow PCP and foreign producers follow LCP.
This corresponds to a world where the home currency is an international reference currency, while monetary shocks are occurring in a non-reference currency. So the home country can be thought of as the USA, for instance, while monetary shocks may be thought of as occurring outside the USA. Table 4 shows that, again, money targeting, price targeting and optimal policy are all 20 identical. In all these cases the value of is zero. As in Case 2, these regimes yield higher welfare than a …xed exchange rate.
This ranking of policy regimes is again easily explained with reference to the output expressions given in Table 1 (17)) so stabilisation of these outputs has no net welfare bene…t to the home economy. It is therefore optimal for the home country to adopt money targeting. As in Case 2, money targeting and price targeting are equivalent
The underlying explanation for these results is the following. When foreign producers follow LCP, home country consumers face prices which are …xed in the home currency and are therefore insulated from changes in the nominal exchange rate. There is therefore no expenditure switching e¤ect for home consumption goods. Exchange rate volatility is thus unimportant for home consumption goods. There is, however, an expenditure switching e¤ect for foreign consumption goods, but volatility in the output of foreign consumption goods has no net impact on home welfare, so exchange rate volatility is irrelevant for the home economy. In both cases the expenditure switching e¤ect, and thus exchange rate volatility, is largely (or completely) irrelevant for home country monetary policy. A policy of money targeting, or equivalently price targeting, is optimal, regardless of the value of the international trade 20 There is a clear parallel between this result and a result obtained by . Devereux et al analyse a model of a reference currency and …nd that the country with the reference currency is indi¤erent to exchange rate volatility while the non-reference country places a high welfare weight on exchange rate volatility. As with most of the LCP literature, Devereux et al focus on the implications of productivity shocks. Furthermore, unlike this paper, they do not compare monetary policy regimes.
Instead they focus on a Nash equilibrium in the choice of monetary rules. Figure 7: in Case 4 elasticity, : Clearly, the crucial feature of both cases is that foreign producers are following LCP. This is su¢ cient to insulate the home country from the exchange rate volatility caused by foreign money shocks and its welfare reducing e¤ects. Now consider Case 4, where home producers follow LCP and foreign producers follow PCP. In this case it is the foreign currency which can be regarded as the reference currency (such as the US dollar) while the home currency is a non-reference currency. The results for this case are given in Table 5 and illustrated in Figures 7, 8 and 9 . These results show, in contrast to Cases 2 and 3, that exchange rate volatility is now very important for home welfare and home monetary policy. The assumption of PCP in the foreign country is clearly su¢ cient to expose the home country to the e¤ects of foreign money shocks.
To understand these points in more detail …rst consider a comparison between money targeting and a …xed nominal exchange rate. As before, money targeting implies = 0 and a …xed rate requires = 1: Table 5 and Figure 8 show that, as in Case 1, money targeting yields higher welfare when is relatively low, while a …xed rate yields higher welfare for larger values of : The output equations in Table 1 This is an important di¤erence between Case 4 and Case 1 (where price targeting is always welfare superior to a …xed rate).
To understand this contrast between the performance of price targeting in Case 1 and 21 Notice again that when < 1 optimal policy implies higher exchange rate volatility than the other regimes. As previously explained, when < 1 the welfare impact of exchange rate volatility is reversed. 
In Case 1, therefore, this term contributes an extra negative impact of monetary activism which does not arise in Case 4. In other words, the optimal in Case 4 is greater than the optimal in Case 1 (when > 1): Optimal policy in Case 4 therefore yields lower exchange rate volatility than in Case 1. Thus, in Case 4, for large values of a …xed exchange rate is closer to optimal policy than price targeting.
Conclusions
This paper analyses the implications of LCP in a two-country model where monetary shocks arise in the foreign country and the policy question is the choice of appropriate monetary regime for the home country. In the presence of foreign monetary shocks, the expenditure switching role of the exchange rate can have a potentially welfare reducing e¤ect because it transmits the e¤ects of foreign shocks to the home economy. LCP has obvious implications for the expenditure switching role of the exchange rate and this paper shows how LCP a¤ects the welfare comparison between policy regimes in the face of foreign monetary shocks.
The paper considers four possible combinations of PCP and LCP. In the case where there is complete and symmetric LCP we …nd that the expenditure switching e¤ect is absent and exchange rate movements play no part in transmitting foreign monetary shocks to the home country. This completely removes any incentive for the home country to stabilise the exchange rate. In this case, ‡oating rate regimes are shown to be welfare superior to a …xed exchange rate. The conclusions are di¤erent, however, if LCP is asymmetric. In the case where home country producers adopt PCP while foreign producers adopt LCP, we …nd that the case for exchange rate ‡exibility is strengthened relative to the symmetric PCP case. But in the opposite case, where home producers follow LCP and foreign producers follow PCP, the case for exchange rate stabilisation is strengthened. In fact, in this second asymmetric case, a …xed rate can out-perform price targeting in welfare terms.
The second asymmetric case corresponds to a world where the foreign currency is an international reference currency (e.g. the US dollar). So the policy problem can be interpreted as the regime choice faced by countries (other than the USA) in a world where trade is priced in US dollars and where US monetary shocks cause ‡uctuations in the value of the dollar. The conclusion is that such countries can bene…t by stabilising (or even …xing) the value of their currency against the dollar. This indeed corresponds to the monetary policy actually adopted by a wide range of emerging market countries.
The …rst asymmetric case corresponds to a world where the home currency is a reference currency, while monetary shocks are occurring in a non-reference currency. The conclusion, in this case, is that exchange rate ‡exibility is a useful way for the home country to insulate itself from foreign monetary shocks.
A: Portfolio Allocation, Asset Prices and Risk Sharing
There are four …rst-order conditions for the choice of asset holdings. After some rearrangement they imply the following four equations
Using the solution procedure outlined in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996, pp. 302-3) it is possible to show that consumption levels in the two countries are given by
and the two asset prices are given by
which implies
which is equation (11) in the main text.
B: Model solution
The equations of the model are summarised in Table 6 . The equations in their exact form are shown in the …rst column and the second-order approximations are shown in the second column. The second-order terms from the approximate form of the equations are summarised in Table 7 . Note that the …rst-order approximation of the model can be obtained from the equations in the second column of Table 6 by setting all the second-order terms equal to zero. Note also that, to a …rst-order approximation, all expected values are zero. The set of equations varies depending on the con…guration of LCP and PCP in the two countries. In Case 1, where both home and foreign producers follow PCP, the relevant set of equations is (B1) to (B16) with second-order terms given by (B19) to (B26) in Table 7 . In Case 2, where both home and foreign producers follow LCP, the relevant set of equations is (B1) to (B14) and (B17) and (B18) with second order terms (B19) to (B24) and (B27) and (B28). In Case 3, where home producers follow PCP and foreign producers 
follow LCP, the relevant set of equations is (B1) to (B15) and (B18) with second order terms (B19) to (B25) and (B28). And in Case 4, where home producers follow LCP and foreign producers follow PCP, the relevant set of equations is (B1) to (B14) and (B16) and (B17) with second order terms (B19) to (B24) and (B26) To solve for welfare it is necessary to obtain a second-order accurate expression for
. It is useful to do this in two stages. In the …rst stage it is possible to solve for E [Ĉ] in terms of the second-order terms P ; P etc. to yield the following expression This expression is identical for all permutations of LCP and PCP across the two countries.
In the second stage it is necessary to substitute for the second-order terms using the expressions in Table 7 . The resulting expression for E[Ĉ] can be further simpli…ed by evaluating second-order terms using …rst-order accurate expressions for realised values. As previously noted, the …rst-order approximation for the model is obtained from the …rst-order parts of the equations listed in column 2 of 
